National Tax Association
Session: Local Tax Policy
14 November 2003
Chicago, Illinois
http://www.buec.udel.edu/craige/nta_lvt.htm
Eleanor D. Craig
Economics Department, University of Delaware[1]
Wilmington is a
city with a steady population of 72,000 in the northeastern corner of Delaware,
30 miles southwest of Philadelphia. The
City has had some economic development successes in the past decade, attracting
thousands of jobs in financial services and housing the legal support for the
“Corporate Capital of the U.S.”
Some of these
successes include a vibrant riverfront with outlet stores offering tax free
shopping, a residential development of older, mostly vacant buildings near the
Amtrak Station called the Ships’ Tavern District; the continuation of the
development of MBNA (the world’s largest independent credit card lender)
headquartered in downtown Wilmington, soon to occupy 1.75 million square feet
of office space; and the conversion by the Buccini/Pollin Group of several
older office buildings into luxury residential apartments and upscale
restaurants. Wilmington is also the home
office of AstraZeneca and the DuPont Company.
Nevertheless, Wilmington, like many other
cities, now faces a fiscal crisis.
Forty-two percent of the property in the city is tax-exempt, and eleven
percent of the residential properties are either uninhabitable or
uninhabited. Ten years ago the City
faced a similar fiscal crisis, and some of the Mayor’s advisors (including this
author) proposed using land value taxes instead of the traditional property
tax. Mayor Daniel S. Frawley accepted
the recommendation and vowed to include it in his re-election campaign
platform.
Positive Economic Impacts
The arguments that persuaded the Mayor
included the following:
Public Sector Actions Create Value.
Much of the price paid for land, especially urban land, reflects value
given to that land by the government.
These amenities provided by the public sector include schools, roads,
utilities, zoning rules, and parks. By
not properly taxing the land, this enhanced value is captured by the private
owner. The resulting land value does
not reflect the effort of the landowner but rather that of society and its
institutions. A carefully formulated
land value tax can capture these land values for the government.
Two identical
pieces of land, one with a modern structure, and the other with a run-down
building, will be taxed differently under most urban property tax schemes. The modern building will be taxed much more
heavily, yet the governmental services required for the run down building, such
as police and fire protection, may actually exceed those necessary for the
modern structure.
The single rate
tax on all property actually provides incentives not to maintain a piece
of property. If a building deteriorates
because it hasn’t been kept up, the tax base is often lowered and the tax
liability reduced.
Efficiency and
Growth. Some economists have placed the efficiency
costs of our current tax system as high as 40% of the revenue generated. These costs are the disincentive effects on
economic activity caused by taxing the income of labor and man-made capital.[2] A tax on land values has no
disincentive effects; the quantity of land is fixed and does not change. However, holding the land in an
unimproved, non-income generating form becomes expensive with a land value
tax. Under such a tax system, owning
dilapidated buildings and vacant lots would carry high costs. Taxing improvements discourages owners from
upgrading their buildings. Using lower,
or zero taxes, on newer buildings and improvements of properties in poor repair
encourages these upgrades. C. Lowell
Harriss, long a proponent of land value taxes says “cities that urgently need
to replace obsolete buildings paradoxically base much of their financing upon a
tax that encourages owners to hold on to deteriorated structures and penalizes
owners of new ones.”[3]
Dick Netzer (1998) estimates that a 2.6% tax solely on
land value throughout the United States would result in tax collections equal
to those gathered by today’s property tax on land and structures.[4] In addition, under such a land tax, as land
is transferred to more profitable uses, that tax rate could fall as the land
values increased.
Discourage Speculative Land Holding. When landowners expect price appreciation on
the land held, under most property tax regimes, there is little penalty for owners
letting their property deteriorate.
Under a tax primarily on land values, owners would be forced to fix up
their property so that it was an income-earning asset, or sell that property. Initially the higher land tax might cause
the value of the land to fall, as owning the land constitutes an obligation to
pay the higher tax, which would be capitalized by lowering the price.
Improve the Health of Center Cities. Urban sprawl into the surrounding
suburbs could be reduced with a tax system that relies heavily on land value
taxes. By making each parcel of land
within the city more productively utilized, there would be less incentive to
work and live outside the city. This is
especially important for an older city like Wilmington, where relatively healthy
suburbs surround the city.
A similar point is that the stronger city center would
reduce the shrinkage of the natural environment around the city, leaving more
open spaces and greenways.
Tool for Devolution of Government Functions. Both in America and in many other
countries around the world, the theory of having government services paid for
at the level of government closest to the benefiting population has gained
considerable strength. A healthy land
value tax system would support this Hamilton-Tiebout model in the public
finance literature. In an era of
looming federal budget deficits, matching consumer preferences for government
services with tax sources becomes even more attractive.
Easy Assessments and Compliance. Netzer estimates the compliance,
administration, and evasion costs of land value taxes as 2% of revenue
collections, compared with 30% for federal income taxes and 20% for state sales
taxes.[5] The assessment process would certainly be
easier, more open, probably fairer, and would carry fewer grievances.
Why Hasn’t Land Value Taxation
Been Universally Adopted?
Political Power of Land Owners. Since many politicians are land owners and
involved with making decisions on land uses for many of their friends, they
prefer not to disturb current property values, and especially not to impose
high costs on land speculators. The
politicians also are fearful that low-density users of land in valuable areas
will have to bear higher tax burdens.
Examples of such low-density users are car dealerships, restaurants,
some retail, and parking lots.
Grandfathering their former tax liabilities or gradually phasing in the
new higher land value taxes could partially offset the greater burden on these
properties.
Most residential land owners would benefit from land
based taxes. In a Drexel University
study of Philadelphia this year, under a land value based tax system, 76% of
households would see their property taxes reduced. The researchers found that land was 21% of the total value of
land and buildings.[6]
Implementation Problems. Some economists find difficulties in assessing the value of land
for non-residential urban uses, especially in central city locations. Mills argues that there isn’t a reliable
mechanism for assessing land values in such regions.[7] Others suggest ways to overcome these
problems, as for example, by having a city purchase and demolish a building and
selling the remaining land to increase the accuracy of land price assessments.[8]
Transition Costs.
These costs exist, but in a city with a good land registration
system, one that already separates the value of land from that of the
structures, and in a city with a decent tax administration, these costs will be
minimal. The property tax rolls
in Wilmington did and still meet these criteria.
Empirical Evidence
Pittsburgh 1976-2001
Oates and Schwab (1997) have done the most
careful analysis of the Pittsburgh experience with land value taxes. They studied the first fifteen years after
the reduction of taxes on structures to one-fifth of that on land. They found that Pittsburgh’s building
activity had an unprecedented increase in the 1980s, “a striking outlier of the
fourteen cities studied”.[9] The real value of building permits grew 70%
annually in the 1980s relative to the twenty-year period before the tax reform,
and during the same period of time in thirteen of the fourteen cities studied,
building permits declined. The
increased building activity was confined to the City; the suburban Pittsburgh
area, without the two-tier structure, saw a construction decline.
Pittsburgh after 2001
In 2000, Pittsburgh had a countywide
reassessment of all property. Voters
thought that if they could get the property tax on land assessment reduced to
the lower tax rate on buildings, they would end up with lower property tax
liabilities. So City Council removed
the two rate graded tax system that had so successfully encouraged Pittsburgh’s
redevelopment. Today, most residential
and business property owners have higher tax burdens; since by using a single
rate on both the land and buildings, the tax rate on buildings had to increase
to generate sufficient revenue.
Predictably, construction activity fell. Comparing the two years before rescission with the two years
after (2001-2), pre-rescission construction spending was 21% higher than
post-rescission. In both the U.S. and
the suburbs of Pittsburgh, construction activity was higher in the two years
2001 and 2002.[10]
Other Cities and Countries
One of the Mayoral candidates in the Philadelphia November 2003 election, Sam Katz, publicly backed the land value tax, as recommended by the Philadelphia Tax Commission in 2002. He used this platform to appeal to the working class community, considered essential for his successful election. He was, however, not elected.
In 1994, the plan to restructure Wilmington’s property tax in order to shift the burden away from structures and toward land, was to be phased in over five years. This would have raised the rate on land to 0.04% compared with the existing rate of 0.008%. This would have increased the property tax revenue collected on land values by six fold, allowing for a significant reduction in the tax on buildings and perhaps a reduction of the City’s wage tax.
Before the Mayor could run for re-election, he met a premature, sudden death, suffering a heart attack while playing basketball. The proposal was then dropped. The current tax rate in Wilmington on both land and buildings is 0.0131% (or 1.31% per $100 of assessed value). Assuming the current residential tax base of $149 million on land and $810 million on buildings, using today’s anticipated revenue from the assessed residential real estate value of $11.6 million, the tax on buildings could be reduced to 0.0% by only increasing the tax on land to 0.09%. As in other cities where such tax structures have been implemented, two thirds of the owners of residential properties would face lower tax bills. There would also be a residual of $1.8 million to help offset a portion of the additional burden that such a tax structure would impose on certain commercial establishments, such as auto dealerships, parking garages, and others with large footprints relative to their revenue generating ability.
Now with the new fiscal crisis, a creative form of land value taxation is under serious consideration. That form is a fine on all vacant dwellings. The fine is graduated and increases as the length of the vacancy increases. If the dwelling has been vacant for one year, the fine is $500, increasing arithmetically to $5000 if the structure has been vacant for 10 years. This fine qualifies as a land value tax by punishing speculators and encouraging owners to generate income from their properties, or alternately, to sell their structures. This fine can achieve many of the same goals as the two-tier tax on land and buildings. The economic growth and efficiency benefits are predicted to be extremely high. In addition, these fines are expected to generate an additional $2 million revenue for the City in fiscal 2004.
As in most other older urban areas, the City of Wilmington is pursuing an aggressive campaign to rid the landscape of the 3500 vacant homes identified by the 2000 U.S. Census[12]. A recent (2003) report by Kise Straw and Kolodner, a Philadelphia architectural firm, found that 50% of Wilmington’s housing was owner occupied, and that with its fairly stable population base; there was an excess supply of housing.[13] They recommended an extensive demolition plan for the vacant housing, and the City plans to tear down approximately 50 of the homes in the worst condition this year. To date, 700 have been identified as not viable for rehabilitation.
Fourteen percent of the vacant homes are owned by public entities, e.g., the City, the Wilmington Housing Authority, and the Wilmington Housing Partnership. These were mostly taken for non-payment of taxes and are gradually being auctioned to the highest responsible bidder with a reasonable plan for the dwelling. One hundred eight such properties will be sold this year.
Although many economists prefer a pure land value tax to the fines implemented recently in Wilmington, those fines should accomplish some of the same resource allocation and efficiency goals long thought desirable in a pure land value tax.
[1] University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, craige@lerner.udel.edu
[2] Netzer, Dick. Relevance and Feasibility of Land Value Taxation in Rich Countries in Netzer, Dick ed.
Land Value Taxation: Can It and Will It Work Today. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
Cambridge, MA 1998
[3] Harriss, C. Lowell. Economic Effects of Today’s Property Tax. 1974, www.progress.org/cg/feet7.htm
[4] Netzer, op. cit., p. 121
[5] ibid, p. 125
[6] McCain, Jensen and Meyer .Research on the Value of Land and Improvements in Philadelphia.
prepared for the City Controller, 12 March 2003, p. 15
[7] Mills, Edwin. The Economic Consequence of a Land Tax. in Netzer, ed. op cit.
[8] Anas, Alex. Commentary to Mills article, ibid
[9] Oates, Wallace and Schwab, Robert. The Impact of Urban Land Taxes: The Pittsburgh Experience.
National Tax Journal L1(March 1997) p. 2
[10] Cord,
Steven, ed. Construction Declines in Pittsburgh After 2-Rate Graded Tax
Rescinded. Incentive
Taxation, April 2003 and Alas, Poor Pittsburgh. Incentive Taxation, June 2003
[11] Saunders, Vernon. The Two-Rate Property Tax in Wenzer, Kenneth, ed. Land-Value Taxation,
MESharpe, Armonk, NY 1999, p. 272
[12] 3500 is 8% of the total housing units in Wilmington.
[13] Kise Straw & Kolodner. City of Wilmington Vacant Property Strategy and City of Wilmington
Residential Improvement Zones, 14 March 2003